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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
-vs-
CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L. 
JOHNSON, his wife; FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A.; 
IDEAL NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 14225 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
j BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
i 
1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff initiated the instant action against 
the defendants to acquire by eminent domain their property 
for road construction purposes. The case was tried before 
a jury with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, presiding. Plain-
tiff appealed and alleged error by the trial court. The 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court after examination 
of the briefs of the parties. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The plaintiff seeks to have defendants1 Petition 
for Rehearing denied and an affirmation of this court's 
decision of May 20, 1976, reversing the trial court and 
remanding the case to the District Court for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE OPINION EVIDENCE 
OF THE PROPERTY OWNER INADMISSIBLE, SINCE ITS BASIS WAS 
NOT PERMITTED BY LAW. 
The defendants, in their Petition for Rehearing, seem 
to be arguing that whenever a witness in a condemnation 
case is the owner of the property to be taken, that such 
witness can then testify to anything he so desires relat-
ing to the value of his property and said testimony is 
properc This position is clearly contrary to the law« 
A witness, even after he has qualified to render opinion 
testimony is governed by the requirements of relevance, 
competence, foundation and all other rules of evidence 
applied by the court. 
In a condemnation case, as the plciintiff has al-
ready pointed out in its brief, the testimony relating 
to just compensation must be what the "fair market value" 
of the subject property was on the date of taking. Even 
a qualified witness cannot be allowed to testify as to 
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his opinion of what just compensation is if he uses a 
basis of something other than that which would establish 
"fair market value." 
The property owner, in the instant case, used as 
his basis for value what the property was worth to him, 
that h£ would hot have sold it for less and operating 
the tavern on the property was his life's work. These 
elements or criteria are not proper in establishing 
fair market value. 
To support this conclusion, the plaintiff refers 
this court to the cases cited in its brief on appeal 
filed'in this case, the cases cited in this courtfs 
opinion and the case of Brown v. Town of Eustis, 293 F. 
197 (D.C. Florida) (1923) , wherein the court rejected 
an owner's testimony because it was based on the personal 
value to him and not market value. 
This proposition is also stated in Nichols on Eminent 
Domain as follows: 
"Sentimental value to 
the owner, or his unwilling-
1 ness to part with the property, 
can have no consideration in 
determining market value. . . . " 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 4 
§ 12.2[2] pp. 12-79, 12-80 
This court was absolutely correct in its finding 
that, "The basis upon which the owner stated the value 
3-
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of the property was not permitted by law," There was 
no other testimony offered by the property owner in this 
case which would have provided an acceptable basis for 
his testimony. He did not recite sales of comparable 
properties to support his opinion of value/ He did not 
testify that he made a cost analysis of what it would 
cost to replace the improvements on the property and 
then deduct accrued depreciation in order to establish 
the value of the improvements and then add the value of 
the land. He did not utilize a capitalized rental income 
approach as a method of establishing market valuer These 
are the traditional methods used by evaluation witnesses 
in establishing market value of real estate in condemna-
tion cases. 
If the property owner's testimony were allowed to 
stand, it; would allow property owners in all such cases 
to say virtually anything they wanted to regarding the 
value of their property. An owner could say property, 
to him, was worth any amount and whether that testimony 
was based on the value to him because of his sentimental 
attachment or because he felt he had developed some busi-
ness "good will" over the years his testimony would still 
stand just because he was an "owner." Such inadmissible 
testimony would become admissible just because it came from 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an owner who had lived on the property for many years 
and was familiar with it. 
Plaintiff submits that an owner is subject to the 
same restrictions as to the admissibility of his testi-
mony (after qualification as a witness) as any other wit-
ness. If the basis for the testimony of an appraiser 
is inadmissible because he used improper elements in 
establishing fair market value the same basis or elements 
are not rendered unobjectionable because they come from 
the mouth of the "owner." 
The defendants, in their Petition for Rehearing, 
have confused a property owner's right to testify with 
the substantive content of his testimony. The right to 
testify may exist, but the content of the testimony of-
fered may be inadmissible. In the instant case, even 
if the right of the owner to testify did exist, the opin-
ion testimony offered by him relating to value should 
have been stricken, since it lacked proper foundation 
and was based on elements of value which are inadmis-
sible in a condemnation trial. 
The plaintiff respectfully requests that this court 
deny the defendants1 Petition for Rehearing, that the 
original finding of this court stand and this case be 
remanded to the District Court for a new trial* 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONALD S. COLEMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
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